Abstract-In this paper we present a novel approach for anonymizing Online Social Network graphs which can be used in conjunction with existing perturbation approaches such as clustering and modification. The main insight of this paper is that by imposing additional constraints on which nodes can be selected we can reduce the information loss with respect to key structural metrics, while maintaining an acceptable risk. We present and evaluate two constraints, 'local1' and 'local2' which select the most similar subgraphs within the same community while excluding some key structural nodes. To this end, we introduce a novel distance metric based on local subgraph characteristics and which is calibrated using an isomorphism matcher. Empirical testing is conducted with three real OSN datasets, six information loss measures, five adversary queries as risk measures, and different levels of k-anonymity. The result show that overall, the methods with constraints give the best results for information loss and risk of disclosure.
INTRODUCTION
ata Privacy in grap hs has recently becom e a topic of renew ed interest by researchers, partially d u e to the em ergence of online social netw orks (OSN ), w hich can be represen ted and analyzed as graphs. OSN d ata is of great p otential for d ata analysts from d ifferent d isciplines, bu t also represents a threat to d ata privacy if it is u sed for the w rong m otives. H ow ever, anonym ization of this type of d ata represents a challenge, given that anonym ization techniqu es m ay d estroy or im pair essential stru ctu ral inform ation in the graph .
The objective of the cu rrent w ork is to test d ifferent pertu rbation and selection m ethod s u nd er d ifferent cond itions to evalu ate their relative perform ance.
In the literatu re, som e au thors have consid ered anonym ization as a graph p artitioning/ clu stering task based on an overall u tility m easu re [1] or by m od ifying nod es u sing a cost fu nction [2] . H ow ever, there is less w ork d one to benchm ark these d istinct m ethod s together and u nd er restricted cond itions. Also, the high cost and / or com plexity of graph search based on isom orphic properties, has led to heu ristic d istance based approxim ate m atching m ethod s. The au thors p ropose that the latter m ethod s w ill be ap propriate w hen the ad versary know led ge is based on grap h topological qu eries, su ch as in the present paper, and / or w hen the pertu rbation m ethod is based on clu stering in w hich case an ad versary isom orphic qu ery on the local su bgraph is ineffective.
The structure of the paper is as follow s: in Section 2 w e d iscu ss the state of the art for the issu es w e are consid ering in this paper; in Section 3 w e present prelim inary concepts and d iscu ss som e aspects su ch as risk d u e to inform ation leak, the privacy m od el, the m erging process and inform ation loss; in Section 4 w e d escribe w hat is u nd erstood as a local neighbo rhood su bgraph, d efine the d istance m etric, graph alteration operators, restrictions, and finally give pseu d o-cod e for the m ethod ; in Section 5 w e d efine the m etrics u sed for inform ation loss and ad versary know led ge, and d efine the privacy m od el; in Section 6 w e d escribe the test d atasets and experim ental p roced u re; in Section 7 w e present the em pirical resu lts for infor-D m ation loss and risk of d isclosu re (ad versary qu eries) for three d istinct graph d atasets, five d ifferent pertu rbation m ethod s and variants, and d ifferent valu es of the privacy level k; finally, in Section 8 we present the su m m ary and som e conclu sions.
RELATED WORK
The them e of privacy p reserving social netw ork pu blishing is consid ered from tw o general perspectives: (i) ad versary inform ation and (ii) anonym ization m ethod s.
Adversary Information
Ad versary inform ation is a w ay of evalu ating the risk of reid entification and norm ally i nvolves 'attacking' the d ata w ith inform ational qu eries w hich take into accou nt the type and am ou nt of know led ge available to the ad versary. In [1] , H ay et al. consid er w hat an ad versary m ay know or d ed u ce from a graph in term s of three d ifferent fam ilies of topological qu eries (as op posed to isom orphic properties). In general, the qu eries focu s on eliciting inform ation abou t the im m ed iate or close neighborhood of a target nod e. The first qu ery is called ' vertex refinement' , w hich retu rns the d egree of a target nod e, of its im m ed iate neighbors, and so on. The second qu ery is called a 'subgraph query' and retu rns the nu m ber of ed ges of a given neighborhood su bgraph. The third qu ery is called a 'hub fingerprint' , w hich retu rns inform ation abou t the proxim ity of a target nod e to one or m ore hu b nod es in the graph. We enter into m ore d etail abou t these three types of inform ation in Section 5.3, given that w e use them to evalu ate risk of d isclosu re in the present w ork. Wond racek [3] presented a d ifferent approach, in that the attacker u ses a m aliciou s w ebsite to obtain info rm ation abou t u sers of an on-line social netw ork. Backstrom et al. [4] is a key reference for ad versary strategies, w hich are d ivid ed into active attacks, in w hich the ad versary activ ely tries to affect the d ata to m ake it easier to d ecipher, and passive attacks, in w hich the ad versary sim ply ob serves d ata as it is presented . The grap h attacked is consid ered to be a single anonym ized copy of a social ne tw ork, and the ad versary qu eries consid er isom orphic properties. In [5] , Cheng et al. consid er a K-Isom orphism ap proach to privacy preserving netw ork pu blication w hich protects against stru ctu ral attacks. The au thors refer to a popu lar type of attack d escribed by Backstrom et al. in [4] , w hich involves the u se of em bed d ed su bgraphs. They extend this id ea by d efining tw o realistic attack targets w hich they call 'N od eInfo' and 'LinkInfo'. They show that kisom orphism , or anonym ization by form ing k pair w ise isom orphic su bgraphs, is both su fficient and necessary for p rotection. H ow ever, the process is show n to be N P -hard . They present som e techniqu es w hich enhance the anonym ization efficiency w hile retaining the d ata u tility.
Anonymization Methods
In the literatu re, d ifferent m ethod s have been u sed for graph anonym ization and in particu lar, obtaining k-anonym ity of the vertices V in a graph G, w hile m inim izing inform ation loss. For the pu rposes of the cu rrent w ork w e w ill d ivid e the m ethod s into tw o grou ps (as has been d one by several au thors in the literatu re): (a) nod e m od ification ap proaches and (b) nod e clu stering ap proaches. In the context of d ata p rivacy in general, Sw eeney's p aper [6] w as the first to d efine k-anonym ity, and m ore recently the paper by De Capitani et al. [7] , gave key d efin itions for privacy levels, inform ation loss and risk of d isclosu re. In [8] Zhou consid ered ld iversity together w ith k-anonym ity to give a stronger anonym ity gu arantee.
N ode modification approaches
N od e m od ification ap proaches act by choosing sim ilar nod es and m aking them id entical. This can be d one by ad d ing nod es to m ake their d egrees the sam e and by ad d ing ed ges to m ake their im m ed iate neighborhood connectivity the sam e. Using this m ethod , k-anonym ity is achieved by obtaining that every nod e in the graph has at least k -1 other nod es w hich are ind istingu ishable from it. Zhou [2] presents a m ethod w hich selects nod es based on a cost fu nction and then anonym izes them by ad d ing nod es and ed ges to their neighborhood s. As w ell as anonym izing the top ology, it generalizes the vertex labels. The topological aspect r e-lies on an elaborate cod ing schem e to speed u p isom orp hic com p arisons betw een su bgraphs. In [9] , N ettleton et al. com pare tw o d ifferent types of online social netw ork from a d ata p riv acy perspective, u sing 'ad d link' as the pertu rbation operator. In [10] , H ay et al. presented a sim ple graph anonym ization based on rand om ad d ition and d eletion of ed ges. The attack m ethod attem pts re-id entification u sing tw o types of qu eries, vertex refinem ent and su bgrap h know led ge. The risk m easu re is consid ered as the percentage of nod es w hose equ iv alent cand id ate set falls into one of a given set of bu ckets (1 nod e, 2-4 nod es, 5-10 nod es, ...). In [11] , Das et al. present a linear p rogram m ing-based techniqu e for anonym ization of ed ge w eights by scram bling the relative ord ering of the ed ges sorted by w eights, w hich p reserves the linear properties of the grap h.
N ode clustering approaches
N od e clu stering app roaches act by choosing sim ilar nod es and physically grou ping them. This can be d one by a k-m eans type algorithm or by a sim ilarity/ d istance m etric to choose sim ilar nod es. Using this m ethod , k-anonym ity is achieved by obtaining that every nod e in the graph is incorporated into a clu ster w ithin w hich there are at least k-1 other nod es.
Skarkala et al. [12] and Liu and Yang [13] have recently follow ed sim ilar approaches for nod e clu stering/ grou ping w hich take into consid eration the privacy p rotection of the ed ge w eights. Skarkala's m ethod [12] em ploys a sim ilarity fu nction to form clu sters each co ntaining at least k nod es. Liu 's m ethod [13] , on the other hand , u sed a k-m eans type clu stering by calculating clu ster centers.
N ettleton in [14] ap plied a p ertu rbation m ethod based on nod e aggregation and a sim ilarity m etric w ith fixed w eights for choosing nod e p airs. Different types of clu stering, fu zzy (fu zzy c-Means) and crisp (k-Means) are ap plied to graph statistical d ata in ord er to evalu ate the inform ation loss d u e to pertu rbation. In [15] , N ettleton and Torra d efine a set of six graph alteration operations for pertu rbation, and evalu ate how each operation affects the graph. The grap h alteration operations consid ered w ere 'ad d / d elete' ed ge, 'ad d / d elete' vertex and 'aggregate/ d isaggregate' nod e.
In [1] , H ay presented an ap proach in w hich nod es are grou ped into p artitions based on a u tility fu nction incorporating a d istance m etric in term s of the nu m ber of ed ges. In ord er to settle the p artitions, the entropy is calcu lated for the entire graph. H ow ever, this p rocess m ay incu r a high com pu tational cost, d epend ing on the grap h size, topology and characteristics. H ay's m ethod [1] is d istinct to ou r approach given that H ay's partitions are gu aranteed as having at least k nod es bu t can have m any m ore (e.g. hu n d red s, for k=16), w hereas ou r m ethod gu arantees betw een k and 2k-1 nod es in each clu ster.
Other approaches
In [16] , Bonchi et al. offer a som ew hat d ifferent vision of grap h anonym ization, d istingu ishing an entropy-based qu antification of anonym ity, w hich they consid er a global m ethod , from a local qu antification based on a-posteriori belief. They also propose a controlled rand om r em oval ed ge (as opp osed to ad d ing ed ges) w hich they call 'rand om sp arsification'. In [17] , Ying and Wu present a spectru m preserving app roach to rand om izing social netw orks. The au thors base their app roach in the observation that m any graph stru ctu res have a strong association w ith the spectru m , hence the id ea to d efine a pertu rbation strategy w hich m inim izes the change in som e given eigenvalu es, w hile m aintaining p rivacy p rotection. Zou et al. [18] propose k-au tom orphism as an anonym ity property to protect against m u ltiple stru ctu ral attacks and d evelop an algorithm that ensu res k-au tom orphism .
PRELIMINARIES
A graph is d efined as a set of vertices V interconnected by a set of ed ges, thu s G = (V, E). In the cu rrent w ork each nod e has an arbitrary id entifier for d ata processing pu rposes how ever w e assu m e this id entifier w ill have no m eaning for the ad versary and cannot be consid ered a label. 
. These three d efinitions apply the hu b, brid ge and com m u nity restrictions, respec tively.
Possible information leaks: the exclu sion of the hu b and brid ge vertices and the lim itation to the sam e com m u nity m ay have inform ation leak consequ ences to the ad versary w hich are com pensated by the red u ction in inform ation loss. We assu m e that w e are interested in pr otecting these three aspects becau se the u ser/ analyst is specifically interested in them from a u tility point of view .
Consid er the situ ation in w hich a given hub vertex v h w ith v e ed ges is exclu d ed from anonym ization. As w e com m ented previou sly, any vertex is the reference nod e v r of its correspond ing local neighborhood su bgraph G n  G. H ow ever, the neighbors of hu b (and brid ge nod es), w hich are not them selves hu b or brid ge vertices, m ay be anonym ized . Consid er the case w hen a neighbor of v h is also neighbor of a vertex w hich is neither a hu b or a brid ge vertex in graph G. In this case it w ill be a cand id ate for anonym ization. Once the neighbor has been anonym ized (that is, aggregated w ith another nod e) the resu lting 'su pernod e' w ill co ntinu e having a link to the hu b nod e (w hich has not been anonym ized ). H ow ever, w hen the anonym ization process has been com pleted for k -anonym ity, the hu b nod e, w hich originally had N neighbors w ill now have N / k neighbors. Also each neighbor w ill be a su pernod e co ntaining at least k original nod es. H ence, althou gh the ad versary m ay be able to id entify a given hu b nod e, s/ he w ill not be able to d istingu ish betw een the k original nod es w hich com prise each su pernod e w hich is a neighbor v h . Another possible risk is w hen a given com m u nity contains a hu b nod e w hich connects to all (or a high percentage) of the nod es in that com m unity. As m entioned previou sly, the neighbors of a hu b nod e w hich are not them selves hu bs (or brid ges) can be anonym ized . H ence the com m u nity cou ld be anonym ized to k -anonym ity, w ith the exception of the hu b nod e.
Community size guarantee: the Lou vain m ethod [21] partitions the com plete graph into comm u nities. H ow ever, given the restriction that nod es can only be anonym ized u sing other nod es from the sam e com m u nity, w e have to gu arantee th at there are at least k eligible nod es in each com m u nity, w here k is the d esired anonym ity level This is achieved by u sing a higher valu e for the 'resolu tion' p aram eter of the algorithm (as im plem ented in Gephi version 0.8.2-beta) w hich controls the com m u n ity size.
H ence the tru e potential inform ation leak for a hu b vertex v h w ill be (| v e +1| -| v e' | ) / N , w here v e' represents the vertices neighbors of v h w hich m ay be anonym ized w ith non -hu b neighbors. The sam e reasoning also applies for brid ge nod es. A w orst case scenario w ou ld be a com m u nity consisting of exactly k nod es of w hich a high proportion are either hu bs or brid ges. H ow ever, by observation, w e have seen that in practice the nu m ber of hu bs and brid ges in a com m u nity tend s to be sm all in relation to the total nu m ber of nod es in the comm u nity. We also note that the nu m ber of hubs and brid ges exclu d ed from anonym ization is red u ced by selecting only a top percentile of them . This selection process w ill be e xplained in d etail in Section 4.4 of the p ap er.
In the case of the brid ge nod es, these w ill tend to have a significantly low er d egree than the hu b nod es and therefore the nu m ber of potentially affected nod es (im m ed iate neighbors) w ill be proportionately low er.
In term s of inform ation leak probability, w e consid er tw o aspects: (i) that the nu m ber of top percentile hu b and brid ge vertices is sm all w ith respect to the nu m ber of vertices in the total grap h, d esignated by (| H | + | B| ) / N ; and (ii) that in a given com m u nity, the nu m ber of neighbor nod es v i of the hub and brid ge vertices (v h and v b , respectively) w hich cannot be m atched w ith at least one other non hu b or brid ge vertex in the sam e com m u nity is also sm all,
here v i is a given nod e in the im m ed iate local neighborhood su bgraph G n of a given hu b nod e v h or a brid ge nod e v b . H ence the inform ation leak probability w ill in practice be sm all and equ al to:
The lim itation that vertex pairs to be anonym ized m u st be in the sam e com m u nity also has inform ation leak consid erations. The size of the com m u nity is a factor in this consid eration. If w e have no restriction based on com m u nity, then all vertices are cand id ates. If w e have M com m u nities w ith M 1 N , M 2 N , …. M n N vertices respectively, w e have a correspond ing red u ction in cand id ate d iversity. Also the ad versary m ay be able to calcu late the co m mu nities given that the Lou vain m ethod is a pu blic alg orithm , and red u ce the search sp ace for victim vertices. We can form alize th e average red u ction in cand id ate d iversity as follow s: let N c be the average nu m ber of vertices per com m u nity; then N / N c w ill be the red u ction in d iversity w ith respect to the com plete grap h, d u e to the partitioning into com m u nities, w hich represents the potential inform ation leak. As m entioned previou sly, w e can gu arantee that there are at least k nod es per com m u nity, u sing the "resolu tion" param eter of the Lou vain algorithm .
Privacy guarantee/model (see also Sec. 5.2): if all N nod es are anonym ized w e w ill obtain k-anonym ity. Consid er a graph G w hich represents a social netw ork and G' w hich represents an anonym ized version of G. If G' is k-anonym ou s then an ad versary w ho lau nches stru ctu ral qu eries cannot re-id entify a given vertex from G in G' w ith a confid ence greater than 1/ k. In the case of the clu stering m ethod s, each su per-nod e in G' w ill contain at least k nod es from G, hence im plem enting k-anonym ity. H ow ever, w e take into consid eration the aspects explained previou sly in this section w ith regard to the nod es (top percentile hu bs and brid ges) w hich are exclu d ed from anonym ization and the restriction that the nod e pairs to be m erged are in the sam e com m u nity.
We highlight that in the p resent w ork w e em ploy an anonym ity m od el for social netw orks su ch that a graph satisfies k-cand id ate anonym ity if for every stru ctu ral qu ery over the graph, there exist at least k nod es that m atch the qu ery (the stru ctu ral qu eries are d efined in Section 5.3). This is sim ilar to the p rivacy m od el of H ay et al. [1] and d istinct from Backstrom 's isom orphic anonym ity [4] .
N odes excluded from k-anonymization: consid er the extrem e case, represented by a k valu e su fficiently large so that all nod es w ou ld be iteratively paired u ntil no m ore pairings are possible in the anonym ized grap h G'. Given ou r restrictions for p airing, w e w ou ld have ju st In Fig. 1 w e see a sim ple exam ple of the m erging process ap plied to an initial graph consisting of 7 sim ple nod es, one brid ge nod e and one hu b nod e. In the anonym ized graph w e see that the H u b and Brid ge nod es have not been aggr egated , w hereas the rem aining 7 nod es have been aggregated into 3 su pernod es containing 2, 2 an d 3 original nod es, respectively. H ence, this graph has a m inim u m anonym ity of k=2 for the basic nod es. The basic nod es have been paired su ccessively based on a sim ilarity m easu re in ord er to m inim ize the overall pertu rb ation.
With respect to the average d egree, in general equ ilibriu m is m aintained , given that, on the one hand the su pernod es have m ore links than the basic nod es, bu t on the other hand , there are progressively less nod es to link to (d eterm ined by the privacy valu e 'k'). For exam ple, w ith reference to Information loss: inform ation loss is m itigated on tw o levels: (i) w e consid er a higher level in w hich w e p rotect the com m u nity stru ctu re of the graph, and the top pe rcentile hu bs and brid ges as key elem ents of the grap h stru ctu re; (ii) at a low er level w e consid er a cost fu nction w hich chooses nod es for clu stering/ m od ification w hich m inim ize the pe rtu rbation to the correspond ing local su b-graphs. The d istance/ cost fu nction and the pertu rbation m ethod s are d escribed in Section 4. In ord er to qu antify the inform ation loss at both levels w e u se six m etrics, as d escribed in Section 5.1: d egree, clu stering coefficient, average p ath length, hub valu e, brid ging centrality valu e and nu m ber of com m u nities, d esignated as m etrics m 1 to m 6 , respectively. In general, if G is the original graph, G' the pertu rbed graph, m 1 represents the d egree valu es for the original grap h, m 1 ' represents the d egree valu es for the pertu rbed graph, then the inform ation loss w ill be:
The inform ation loss for m etrics m 2 to m 5 w ou ld follow in a sim ilar m anner. In the case of m 6 , w e take the absolu te d ifference betw een the nu mber of com m u nities N c in G and the nu m ber of com m u nities N c ' in G' , thu s:
The valu e obtained from equ ation (2) can be n orm alized in ord er to com pare betw een d ifferent benchm ark d atasets.
METHOD DESCRIPTION
We present a m ethod w hich is based on selecting the k m ost sim ilar nod es and then pertu rbing them to m ake them id entical, either by clu stering or by m od ification. The sim ilarity m etric ap proxim ates an isom orphism m atcher and also takes into accou nt the d egrees of the neig h- Table 1 , and w ill be explained in d etail in the follow ing Sections. 
Definition of local neighborhood subgraph
In ord er to clearly d efine w hat w e u nd erstand as a 'local neighborhood su b-graph, w e w ill refer to 
Distance metric for similarity based selection
In the present w ork, w e d efine a hybrid app roach w hich ad opts som e aspects of the p artitioning app roach [1] , and other aspects of the cost fu nction ap proach [2] [11] [12] . We effectively obtain generalized p artitions w hich m inim izes inform ation loss by u sing a sim ilarity fu nction to choose nod e pairs (and their local neighborhood s) for anonym ization w hose d istance is a m inim u m . H ence, the inform ation loss cau sed by their pertu rbation w ill be proportionately m inim ized . We recall that the objective of id entifying sim ilar su bgraphs (local neighborhood s) is in o rd er to clu ster or m od ify nod es as a m echanism to provid e k anonym ity. Each su bgrap h is consid ered as being the one hop neighborhood arou nd a given nod e w hich is to be aggrega ted . H ence, w e w ish to aggregate nod e p airs w hich are as sim ilar as possible, in term s of a given set of d escriptive characteristics.
In ord er to calcu late the sim ilarity betw een tw o nod e neighborhood s, com pu tation cost is a key consid eration. H ence w e have chosen a sim ilarity m etric w hich calcu lates a d istance based on su bgraph characteristics w hich can be pre-calcu lated . The su bgrap h characteristics are: d egree of the reference nod e D R ; num ber of ed ges in the su bgraph N E , clu stering coefficient CC, norm alized average d egree of ad jacent nod es AD AN , norm alized stand ard d eviation of d egree of ad jacent nod es SD AN . The first three characteristics are d esigned to reflect the inte rnal stru ctu re of the su bgraph, w hereas the last tw o characteristics reflect a key characteristic of the neighbors (their d egree), w hich effectively consid ers the neighborhood one hop fu rther ou t (from the reference nod e as starting point). We observe that in ord er to perform the calculation, all valu es are norm alized against the m axim u m and m inim u m correspond ing valu es in the com plete graph.
The objective of the training step is to optim ize the w eights and obtain a fu nction w hich m od els an isom orphism m atcher/ neighbor d egree m atcher, bu t w hich has a m u ch low er ru ntim e com pu tation cost, once w e have trained th e w eights and pre-calcu lated the necessary statistical valu es.
In ord er to captu re isom orp hic and neighborhood characteristics, in a preprocessing step w e trained the w eights of the d istance m etric (there is one w eight for each characteristic) u sing sim u lated annealing and a special isom orphism m atcher to calcu late the fitness valu e. We have u sed the VF2 isom orp hism m atcher [23] , given that it is one of the fastest algorithm s cu rrently available, and is now w id ely u sed in the grap h m ining com m u nity. We have ad apted VF2 so that it also retu rns a score of how w ell the respective neighborhood nod es m aintain their d egree valu es. We call this m atcher VF2-D.
Precision: in term s of the su bgraph characteristics, after ru nning 10 fold training, w e o btained 100% test accu racy on the reference nod e d egree valu e and clu stering coefficient of the su bgraph at one hop, 94% correlation w ith the neig hbor d egrees and 97% correlation w ith the nu m ber of internal ed ges of each neighbor. On average, for the test d atasets, app rox. 70% of the top k-1 nod es ranked by the d istance fu nction w ere isom orphism s.
Graph alteration operators -clustering and modification
In ord er to com pare the relative perform ance of the r estricted and non restricted ap p roaches, w e have u sed tw o of the most com m on state of the art techniqu es in the literatu re: (i) nod e m od ification and (ii) nod e clu stering. We note that all the m ethod s u se the sam e nod e m atching fu nction, w hich is d escribed in Section 4.2.
N ode modification: for this m ethod w e have im plem ented a techniqu e based on nod e add ition and ed ge ad d ition/ d eletion w hich obtains k-anonym ity u sing a cost fu nction based on the expected pertu rbation. This m ethod is sim ilar to the one presented by Zhou in [2] . Du e to the u navailability of the original cod e, w e have program m ed and tested ou r ow n version. The im plem entation u ses the d istance m easu re (see Section 4.2) as the cost fu nction, and selects nod es for m atching in d escen d ing ord er of d egree, as ind icated in [2] . Also, w hen w e ad d a nod e to increase the d egree, w e choose them sm allest d egree first, again follow ing the gu id elines of [2] . Finally, ed ges are ad d ed to obtain the sam e internal d egree sequ ences and m inim ize the d ifference betw een the respective su b -graph clu stering coefficients. H ence, for nod e m od ification, tw o su bgraphs SG 1 and SG 2 are consid ered equ al w hen, for the reference nod e g 1 of SG 1 and the reference nod e g 2 of SG 2 : d egree(g 1 ) = d egree(g 2 ) , nu m _ed ges(SG 1 ) = nu m _ed ges(SG 2 ) and internal_d egree_sequ ence(SG 1 ) = internal_d egree_sequ ence(SG 2 ). As m entioned in the introd u ction and in the privacy m od el d efinition (Section 5.2) w e apply a dversary qu eries based on stru ctu ral sim ilarity of nod e neighborhood s [1] rather than on isom orphic properties [4] . H ence, this equ ality criterion is ad equ ate for both the type of ad versary qu eries w e consid er in the cu rrent paper, and in ord er to com p are the relative pe rform ance of the d ifferent m ethod s u nd er the sam e cond itions.
Tw o versions are im plem ented : the first has no r estrictions so it can choose nod es to m atch anyw here in the graph. We call this 'm od if_g'; the second is restricted by the com m u nity, hub and brid ge nod es, and is called 'm od if_r_l1'. The restricted version w ill be d escribed in Se ction 4.4. N ode clustering: for this m ethod w e have im plem ented a nod e aggregation m ethod w hich grou ps the nod es into su pernod es each of w hich contains at least k and at m ost 2k-1 of the original nod es. An optim u m clu stering is obtained by u sing a sim ilarity fu nction (see Section 4.1) to p air the m ost sim ilar nod es for aggregation for each k valu e. H ence, for each nod e in the graph, the k-1 m ost sim ilar nod es w ill be id entified as these nod es w ill u n ified into one su pernod e. If there are 2k or m ore id entical nod es (that is, taking into accou nt that some nod es w ill alread y be id entical in the graph), they w ill be grou ped in su pernod es each containing at least k nod es and at m ost 2k-1. Three versions are im plem ented : the first has no restrictions so it can choose nod es to m atch anyw here in the graph. We call t his 'clu st_g'; the second is restricted by the com m u nity, hu b and brid ge nod es, as d escribed in Section 4.4 and tries to m atch nod es in as local a neighborhood as possible. We call this 'clu st_r_l1'; finally, the third is restricted in the sam e m anner as the second , bu t can m atch nod es anyw here w ithin a given com m u nity. We call this 'clu st_r_l2'. The restricted versions w ill be d escribed in Section 4. 
Search restriction variants: 'global', 'local1' and 'local2'
We consid er three search strategies: (i) 'global' in w hich nod es can be searched for and m atched anyw here in the graph; (ii) 'local1' in w hich nod e search an d m atching is restricted to the sam e com m u nity and exclu d es top hu b and brid ge nod es. This m ethod fu rther restricts by trying to find the best m atch w hich is also locally th e closest to the reference nod e; (iii) 'local2' in w hich nod e search and m atching is restricted to the sam e com m u nity and exclu d es top hu b and brid ge nod es. In contrast to 'local1', 'local2' can search for nod es anyw here w ithin the sam e com m u nity.
Local1: searches in an expansive m anner arou nd the imm ed iate neighborhood of the refe rence nod e, w ithin the comm u nity to w hich the reference nod e belongs. It looks for nod e m atches w hose sim ilarity d istance is w ithin a given threshold  (assigned as the average sim ilarity for all nod e pairs in the com plete graph). Local2: searches for the best m atch of a given reference nod e, anyw here in the com m u nity to w hich the refer ence nod e belongs.
For the restricted m ethod s w e initially execu te a "Com m u nity Stru ctu re" algorithm to p a rtition the com plete graph into "com m u nities". We u se Blond el's algorithm , know n as the Lou vain Method [21] . We also id entify the top 12% percentile hu b nod es and 10% percentile brid ge nod es by calcu lating their corresp ond ing m etrics. The percentile va lu es w ere chosen by em pirical stu d y of the m etric d istribu tions. In practice, these top percentile proportions tend to represent a sm all nu m ber of key nod es in the graph.
Pseudo-code of method
In this section w e d efine the m ain proced u res w hich com prise the ap proach: "Precalcu late", "Train" and "Ru n" (the latter calls each of the five m ethod s).
Procedure Main
Input: original graph G = (V, E), anonym ization level k Output: anonym ized graph G') 1. Precalculate 2. Calculate statistics for each local area subgraph SG 1 … SG n 3. Calculate brid ge and hub m etrics 4. Calculate com m unities c 1 … c i using Louvain m ethod 5. Train 6. For each sam ple s, apply sim ulated annealing process to find optim um w eights for d istance function 7. Run 8. Let B be the set of brid ge nodes b above the brid ge percentile threshold 9. Let H be the set of hub nodes h above the hub percentile threshold 10. Let k be the privacy level
FOR EACH (g) ϵ (G) , g B , g H

12.
Let c i be the com m unity to w hich nod e g belongs 13.
Define 
METRICS FOR INFORMATION LOSS, PRIVACY LEVEL AND RISK OF DISCLOSURE
In this Section w e give ou r d efinitions for inform ation loss and risk of d isclosu re. Inform ation loss is d efined in the habitu al m anner, as the change in correlation betw een each variable's d ata in the original file and the pertu rbed file. For risk of d isclosu re w e d efine a set of cand id ate anonym ity qu eries, sim ilar to those of H ay [1] .
Information Loss
We u se six m etrics in ord er to evalu ate inform ation loss. The first three are basic grap h statistics (d egree, clu stering coefficient and average p ath length), and the last three are related to the com m u nity stru ctu re of the graph (hu b m etric (H ITS), betw eenness centrality and nu m ber of com m u nities). The d istribu tion of each variable in the or iginal d ata file is com p ared (correlated ) w ith that of the sam e variable in the pertu rbed file, and the d eviation from 1 is the i nform ation loss.
inf loss 1 d egree inf loss 2 clu stering coefficient inf loss 3 average p ath length inf loss 4 We have im plem ented the 'cc', 'apl' and 'brid ging centrality' algorithm s in Java. In the case of the 'apl' (average p ath length) statistic, w e have u sed Dijkstra's algorithm [24] . In the case of hu b valu e (H ITS) and betw eenness centrality, w e have calcu lated these u sing the Gephi softw are [25] .
Bridge nodes. These are nod es w hich m ay not necessary have a high d egree bu t w hich are "strategically" placed betw een nod es su ch that they form key part of the graph stru ctu re. That is, their rem oval w ou ld cau se a m ajor d isru ption to the grap h stru ctu re. It can be consid ered in term s of the nu m ber of critical p aths w hich go throu gh it, from / to other nod e s (this is know n as "betw eenness centrality". We u se the m easu re pu blished by H w ang et al. in [20] , called "brid ging centrality", and w hich is very effective in d istingu ishing brid ge nod es from hu b nod es.
Hub metric (HITS hub).
A hu b nod e is characterized by having a large nu m ber of d irect connections to other nod es. In ord er to qu antify the hu b valu e of a nod e, w e have used the popu lar H ITS algorithm , as d efined by Kleinberg in [19] .
Communities. The com m u nity partitioning is a key characteristic of the gr aph that w e w ish to m aintain. We m easu re inform ation loss by the num ber of com m u nities into w hich the grap h is p artitioned , as calcu lated by the Lou vain m ethod [21] .
Definition of Privacy for clustering and modification methods
The objective of anonym ization is to obtain a given an onym ity level of k, as stated in Section 3. As d escribed in Section 4, the clu stering algorithm is given the param eter k and prod u ces a grap h consisting of su pernod es w hich contain a m inim u m of k and a m axim u m of 2k-1 basic nod es. If a su pernod e reaches a size of 2k nod es, it w ill be d ivid ed into tw o su pernod es, each containing k nod es. N od es are grou ped based on sim ilarity u sing the d istance m etric d escribed in Section 4.2. H ence, nod es are grou ped into p artitions (each cont aining betw een k and 2k-1 nod es), so that an ad versary w ill be u nable to d istingu ish betw een the nod es in a partition. The probability that an ad versary su ccessfu lly re-id entifies a nod e w ill be betw een 1/k and 2k-1, m u ltiplied by the nu m ber of su pernod es created for the given reference nod e (w e note that su pernod es are also created u sing id entical nod es). For the m od ification algorithm , w e have im plem ented an approxim ation of Zhou 's m ethod [2] w hich, for a given nod e, m od ifies k-1 other nod es to m ake them the sam e (u sing ou r d istance based sim ilarity m etric). That is, for each nod e there w ill be k-1 other nod es w ith the sam e d egree, nu m ber of ed ges in the one hop su bgraph, and sam e clu stering coefficient (that is, the connectivity betw een neig hbors). H ence, the probability of an ad versary re-id entifying a nod e w ill be at least 1/k. We note that nod es w hich are alread y id entical w ill not be m od ified and there w ill probably be nod es in the graph w hich alread y have m ore than k id entical nod es (especially the low d egree nod es).
As com m ented in Section 3, w e em ploy an anonym ity m od el su ch that a graph satisfies kcandidate anonym ity if for every stru ctu ral qu ery over the graph, there exist at least k nod es that m atch the qu ery (the stru ctu ral qu eries are d efined in the follow ing section).
Adversary Knowledge -structural queries
We follow sim ilar lines to H ay [1] in term s of w hat the attacker know s or can d ed u ce from the grap h. Firstly, w e consid er vertex refinement, as d efined by H ay in [1] . Then w e consid er subgraph queries, hub fingerprint and a new attack w e d efine for the first tim e in this paper, w hich w e w ill call bridge fingerprint.
Vertex refinement [1] : H 1 (x) retu rns the d egree of x, H 2 (x) retu rns the m u lti-set of each neighbors' d egree, and so on. In general, H i (x) retu rns the m u lti-set of valu es w hich are the resu lt of evalu ating H i− 1 on the set of nod es ad jacent to x. We consid er u p to tw o levels of qu ery, H 1 and H 2 as d efined in [1] .
Subgraph queries [1] : nu m ber of ed ge facts an ad versary need s to know in ord er to id entify a su bgraph arou nd a target nod e. The su bgraph qu ery SG(x) retu rns the nu m ber of ed ges in the su bgraph of a nod e x w ith its im m ed iate neighbors (1 hop). Bridge fingerprint: a brid ge is a nod e w hich m ay not have a high d egree, bu t acts as a co n-nector betw een a high nu m ber of nod es. We can d efine tw o types of brid ge: (i) local brid ges w hich connect hu bs, that is, the shortest path betw een tw o or m ore hu bs is throu gh the brid ge nod e. We can also d efine a local lim it, su ch as 1 or 2 hops, to the su bgraph consid ered ; (ii) global brid ges throu gh w hich m any shortest p aths pass from all over the ne tw ork. Given that global brid ges are m u ch m ore d ifficu lt to id entify, w e w ill choose local brid ges as the fingerprint, given that an attacker w ill find it easier to id entify the hu bs and the nod es w hich act as brid ges betw een in a local neighborhood . Thu s w e d efine a brid ge fi ngerprint qu ery F i (x, BR) w hich gives a list of the shortest paths from x to each of the brid ge nod es d efined in the vector BR, w ith a visibility horizon of i.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this Section w e d escribe the d atasets u sed and the modus operandi of the experim ents.
Datasets
We have u sed the Ca-H epTh [26] , Enron [27] and WikiVote [28] 
Benchmark methods and Experiments
EMPIRICAL TESTING AND RESULTS
In this Section w e present the resu lts for inform ation loss and ad versary su ccess for the d iffe rent m ethod s, m etrics and d atasets.
Information Loss Vs anonymization (k) level
For the m etrics of Fig. 3 (d Fig. 4 w e see the inform ation loss for the 'brid ge' statistic. We observe that the 'w ikivote' d ataset has again given the greatest inform ation loss, w ith the valu e losing practically all its correlation for all m ethod s w ith the exception of 'm od if_r_l2'. This is sim ilar to the resu lt for the average p ath length (apl) and the sam e d ataset. This is logical if w e co nsid er that the brid ges 'hold together' the d ifferent regions of the graphs, hence a loss to the brid ges w ill greatly affect the traversal d istan ces across the com plete graph. We recall that one of the m easu res w e have taken to 'protect' the graph topology is to exclu d e from aggregation the top 10% percentile, for the restricted m ethod s. In the case of the 'hepth' d ataset this seem s to have w orked relatively w ell, w ith an inform ation loss of betw een 40 and 50% for k=16. In the case of the 'enron' d ataset, the inform ation loss also com pares favorably for the restricted m ethod s, w ith respect to the non-restricted m ethod s w hich have no protection for brid ges. The reasons for the poorer perform ance for 'w ikivote' m u st be topological, and cou ld be rela ted to a higher proportion of significant brid ging nod es w hich are how ever not in the top 10% percentile.
The final row of Fig. 4 show s the raw valu es of a graph m etric w hich is specifically related to the com m u nity stru ctu re of the graph: nu m ber of com m u nities. We are p articu larly interested in this featu re and have expressly im plem ented restrictions on the pertu rbation to pr otect the overall 'com m u nity stru ctu re' of the graph, as d escribed p reviou sly. In the third row of Fig. 4 w e see the effect of increasing k on the nu mber of com m u nities. We see that the restricted m ethod s give m u ch better resu lts than the non -restricted ones, in term s of the change in the nu m ber of com mu nities, for increasing levels of k. We see in all cases that the 'clu st' (u nrestricted ) m ethod d isplays the highest inform ation loss. For the 'Wikivote' d ataset, the 'm od if_g' m ethod d isplayed an atypical behavior for k=2. We take note that the 'hepth' d ataset has approx. 10 tim es as m any com m u nity partitions as the other tw o d atasets. In su m m ary of these resu lts, w e can conclu d e that the m easu res taken to protect the com m u nity stru ctu re have w orked as expected , m inim izing the change in the correspond ing key characteristic. In Tables 3 and 4 
Risk (adversary information) Vs anonymization (k) level
The risk is qu antified by applying five d ifferent ad versary qu eries, as w e have pr eviou sly d escribed in Section 5.3. The risk is m easu red in term s of cand id ate set sizes, follow ing the gu id elines of H ay [1] . That is, the highest risk exists for nod es for the low est cand id ate set size (=1), w hereas the low est risk exists for nod es for the highest cand id ate set size. Throu ghou t the follow ing text w e w ill u se the term 'bu cket' as a synonym for 'cand id ate set'. In Figs. 5 and 6 the risk is plotted for each of the ad versary qu eries, for each d ataset and for increasing valu es of k. For sp ace restrictions, only the low est risk cand id ate set (bu cket) is show n for each ad versary qu ery. H ow ever, in the text w e com m ent the proportions in the other bu ckets, w henever significant. The proportion of nod es in th e low est risk bu cket is a key ind icator of risk and w as the bu cket w hich best characterized the ad versary qu eries and m ethod s.
The bu ckets for ad versary qu eries 1, 2, 4 and 5 w ere d efined w ith the follow ing frequ encies: '=1', '2-4', '5-10', '11-20' and '>20'. For ad versary qu ery 3 (ed ges), the follow ing bu ckets w ere d efined : '=1', '2-10', '11-100', '101-1000' and '>1000'.
We also m ake clear that the cand id ate sets are based on the nu m ber of nod es retu rned by the ad versary qu eries for the anonym ized graphs. This gives a vision from the view point of the ad versary. We observe that, for the clu stering m ethod s, each nod e (su pernod e) retu rned w ill contain a m inim u m of k and a m axim u m of 2k-1 basic nod es (see Section 5.2). H ence, for k=16, every aggregated (su p er) nod e contains betw een 16 and 31 elem ental nod es of the original graph. Therefore, althou gh to the ad versary it appears that s/ he has fou nd a u niqu e nod e in the graph, this nod e really contains betw een 16 and 31 elem ental nod es. Internally (not pu blished ), w e know how m any basic nod es each su pernod e contains and this is u sed to place it in the correspond ing frequ ency bu cket. In the case of the m od ification m ethod s, for each nod e there w ill be at least k-1 id entical nod es in the grap h. H ence, w hen an ad versary qu ery retu rns one nod e, its frequ ency w ill be equ al to the nu m ber of nod es, w hich w ill be at least k-1, labeled as being id entical to it in the graph . In likelihood term s, if the ad versary is trying to id entify a specific nod e (for exam ple, correspond ing to u ser 'john'), and the qu ery retu rns a single nod e, then the chances of that nod e being that of 'john' w ill be at least 1/k. Fig. 5 (row 1) show s the trend s for th e d ifferent cand id ate sets, d atasets and valu es of k, for the first ad versary qu ery, vertex refinem ent H 1 (x). We recall that this qu ery sim ply retu rns the d egree of a given nod e. If w e first consid er Fig. 5 (row 1) in term s of the proportion of nod es in each cand id ate set, w e observe for all original d atasets (k=0) that the great m ajority (90%) of the d egree valu es are in the highly frequ ent cand id ate set ('>20', low risk), and the rem aining 10% are d istribu ted throu gh the other, higher risk cand id ate sets, '=1', '2-4', '5-10' and '11-20'. In the case of the bu cket '11-20', all m ethod s follow ed a sim ilar trend w ith the exception of 'clu st_g' w hich follow ed a m arked ly u pw ard grad ient, giving a significantly higher relative proportion of nod es in the bu cket '11-20', w ith respect to the other m ethod s. Also, 'm od if_g' displayed a slightly d ifferent tend ency, w ith a relatively low er p rop ortion of nod es in the bu cket for the 'enron' and 'w ikivote' d atasets. We note that for k=16, there w ill be zero nod es in the '=1', '2-4' and '5-10' bu ckets.
Adversary query 1: vertex refinement H 1 (x)
If w e now look at Fig. 5 (row 1), w e see that all m ethod s follow a sim ilar trend , w ith the exception of 'clu st_g' w hich show s a low er proportion of nod es in the '>20' bu cket, w it h respect to the other m ethod s. Fig. 5 (row 3) show s the trend s for the d ifferent cand id ate sets, d atasets and valu es of k, for the third ad versary qu ery, su bgraph SG(x). We recall that this qu ery retu rns the nu m ber of ed ges in the su bgraph form ed by the im m ed iate neighbors of a given nod e. Firstly w e note that the cand id ate set size ranges are d istinct from those of the d egree (Fig. 5, row 1 ) and neighbor d egrees (Fig. 5, row 2) . This is becau se the m agnitu d e of the valu e 'nu m ber of ed ges' for the su bgraph consid ered is m u ch greater than the d egree valu es. H ence the set sizes reflect this, w ith the biggest set size (low est risk) set to '>1000'. The set sizes w ere assigned by observing the d istribu tions for each d ataset of the nu m b er of ed ges. We w ere also initially gu id ed by the ranges u sed by H ay in [1] for the ed ge fact.
Adversary query 2: vertex refinement H 2 (x)
Adversary query 3: subgraph edge query SG(x)
In general w e see sim ilar trend s for the d ifferent d atasets and bu ckets, w ith the follow ing exceptions: for the 'hepth' d ataset the 'clu st_g' m ethod d isplays a higher relative proportion of nod es in bu cket '101-1000' and a m u ch low er relative proportion of nod es in bu cket '>1000', w ith respect to the other method s; also, the 'm od if_g' m ethod show s a d i stinctive trend in several cases, d isplaying a low er proportion for the '101-1000' bu cket. With respect to the original d atasets (k=0), w e observe that the m ajority of the vector fr equ encies are in the '>20' cand id ate set. This bu cket initially contains ap prox. 92% of the nod es for 'enron', 80% for 'w ikivote' and 99% for 'hepth'. The 'hepth' has the m ost 'extrem e' cand id ate set m em bership in w hich practically all the nod es are in the '>20' set. This d istribu tion is som ew hat d istinct from the 'hu b fingerprint' qu ery, w hich had app rox. 20% less nod es in the '>20' set and ap prox. 40% of the rem aind er d istribu ted am ong the m id -range sets, for the 'enron' and w ikivote' d ataset. In term s of the m ethod s, w e see a sim ilar behavior for the d ifferent m ethod s, w ith the follow ing exceptions: 'clu st_g' has a higher proportion of nod es in bu cket '11-20' for k=16 and the w ikivote and hepth d atasets; 'clu st_g' also has a progressively low er proportion of nod es for the '>20' bu cket; 'm od if_g', on the other hand , tend s to show a slightly low er percentage for the '11-20' bu cket and a slightly higher one for the '>20' bu cket, relative to the other m ethod s.
Summary and synthesis of the analysis of the adversary query results (Sections 7.2.1 to 7.2.5)
In this Section w e w ill present an overall pictu re of the resu lts of the d ifferent ad versary qu eries, taking into accou nt the d etailed analysis w hich w e ha ve alread y seen in Sections 7.2.1 to 7.2.5. In ord er to synthesize the resu lts in a qu antitative m anner, w e w ill rank the m ethod s and d atasets, in term s of their perform ance for increasing valu es of k and ad versary qu ery type. We w ill u se the cand id ate set w ith the highest nu mber of cand id ates (low est risk) as the benchm ark. It is clear that the m ore cand id ates that fall into this category the better becau se they w ill have the low est id entification risk. We w ill follow the sam e evalu ation m ethod as w e d id for the inform ation loss in Section 7.1. 
